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Droft Recommendation
on the latest dettelopments in south-eastern Europe
The Assembly,
(i) Satisfied that intemational intervention put an end to the intolerable human rights violations
which President Milosevic's regime perpetrated on a massive scale against the Albanian population of
Kosovo;
(i) Welcoming the fact ttrag initial differences betwesn the countries concemed having bee,n re-
solved, it was possible to achieve unanimity in the UN Security Council and to adopt Resolution 1244
as the basis for joint international action to restore peace and stability in Kosovo;
(iii) Noting that tlN Security Council Resolution 1244 anvisages the establishment of an intema-
tional civilian presence in Kosovo providing an interim administration under which the people of
Kosovo "can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia... while establish-
ing and overseeing the developmeirt of provisional dsmocratic self-governing institutions";
(iv) Considering the responsibility the intenrational civil presence has to promote 'the establishment,
pendrng a final settlement of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, takrng firll account
of annex 2 arrd of the Rambouiilet Accords"; facilitate "a political process designed to dstermine
Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillst Accords" an4 in a final stage, oversee "the
transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement";
(") Noting that international support for substantial autonomy and self-govemment in Kosovo will
be called into question if Kosovar Albanians are unable to respect the rights of minorities 
- 
including
Serbs and Roms 
- 
on the territory of Kosovo;
(vi) Emphasising that under Resolution 1244, Kosovo is not intended to be a protectorate but an
entity where citizens have responsibility for self-goveming institutions able to provide the conditions
necessary for a peaceful and normal life forthe entire community;
(vi, Noting in particular the siuation in Mitovica, where a Serb e,nclave has been established de
facto, and Orahovac, where civilian road blocks have prevented a Russian KFOR unit from entering the
town since last Augus[
(wii) Considering that the highest priority should be given to addressing the issue of the 5 000 or so
missrng persons whose fate and whereabouts are unknown 
- 
among them both Kosovar Albanians and
Serbs 
- 
for while that matter remains unresolved, reconciliation between ethnic groups seems highly
problematic;
(o) Noung that, owing to the fact that commitnents regarding personnel and frrndrng have not yet
been honoure4 the human and financial resources urgently needed for frrll implementation of UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1244 are still not in place;
(x) Noting that neittrer the UN Security Council Resolution nor the Rambouiflet Accords offer any
indication as to what the terms "final settlement" and "Kosovo's future status" in fact mean;
(n) Noting that the multinational armed forces and international organisations have failed to deliver
the immediate emergency support called for by the situation in Kosovo and the terms of their mission
there;
(ni) Noting that, atpresent, aa overwhelming majority of the countries involved in restoring peace
and stability in the region are not in favour of the independent Kosovo advocated by many, if not all,
Kosovar Albanian political leaders;
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(riii) Aware that a Greater Albania plays no part in the aspirations of the Kosovar Albanian leader-
ship or of the present Albanian Governme,nq which regards the idea of such an entity within the region
as utopia:r and unrealistic;
(xiv) Convinced that full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, including the es-
tablishment of provisional institutions for democratic self-govenrment will take some considerable time;
(rv) Noting that the international community responsible for the status of Kosovo, being fulty ap-
prised of the fact that an overwhelming majority of Kosovar Albanians aspire to full independence
sooner or later, should keep a tight hold on the situation and not allow itself again to be overtaken by
events;
(rvi) Considering that under such circumstances priority should be given to fuIl implementation of
LJN Security Council Resolution 1244, including making available the financial and human resoruces
and military and police forces that are urgently needed for UNMIK to operate effectively and carry out
its tasks to the full;
(xvii) Taking the view that loci elections leading to tlre establishment of some form of dsmocratically
elected authority must be organised in 2000, so as to legitimise administrative power in the lower tiers
of local government;
(rw'il Noting that, while Albania is still grappling with the deleterious effects of recent consecutive
crises, it is making an effort to consolidate its dsmocratic institutions and transform and develop its
economy;
(nx) Aware that restoration of public order and security is one of the priorities of the Albanian Gov-
ernmen! but noting that continuous technical and financial support from the international community is
required to achieve this vital objective;
(ru) Noting with satisfaction that FYROM provided ample evidence of political maturity throughout
the Kosovo conflict, notwithstarding the massive influx of refugees across its borders;
(ni) Emphasising, however, that Europe should continue to follow developments in these counties
closely and provide the financial and other assistance urgently needed to further tansfonrU consolidate
and develop their economies, and, if necessary, should also deploy military force to guarantee interul
peace and stability and hamess tlrem ever more closely to the European Union;
(wi, Emphasising thaq notwithstanding the fact that peace has been established, the currert situation
in Bomia and Herzegovina still gives rise to concern in view of the fact that comrption is rife, negligible
progress is being made with refugee rehrrns and urgently needed reforms to the economy, judiciary and
police and also that little headway has been made towards the multi-sthnic society advocated in ttre
Dayton Peace Agreement;
(wiii) Welcoming the Government of Montenegro's denunciation of Serbia's policy towards Kosovo
and the steps it has taken towards economic development and democracy;
(fri, Concernd however, at tlre idea that the negotiations over what Montenegro describes as a more
equal relationship within the FRY mrght fail, notwithstanding reassuring public staternents from both
President Milosevic and President Djukanovic, since there is no guarantee that Montenegro, having
withstood the crisis in Kosovo, can cope with the way the situation is developing;
(wr) Noting ttrat a change of governmeirt in Belgrade is scarcely imminsnt and ttrat European coun-
ries that aspire to peace and stability in south-eastem Europe should continue to support Serbian op-
position parties seeking to end Serbia's isolation in Europe and bring about its integratioq as a de,mo-
cratic state, in Euro-Atlantic stuchrres;
(wvi) Convinced that integration in the European Union is ttre ultimate destiny of all the states of
south-eastern Europe, whilst fusing aware t]rat this can only come about if t]rose states firlfil ttre neces-
sary conditions in terms of, inter alia, democratic institutions, human rights compliance and a viable
market economy;
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(wril Welcoming the adoption of the Stability Pact for South-Eastem Europe and the activities of the
different Working Tables, and assuming that the European Union willvery soon provide adequate fin-
ancial and human resources to putthe aims of the Pact into effect,
RECOMMENDS THAT TFIE COUNCIL
l. Ask the European Union to make available at short notice its firll share of ttre financial and
human resources urgently needed for TINMIK to operate effectively and carry out its tasks to the fuIl;
2. Askthe European Unionto make every effortto preventthe outbreak of further violence in south-
eastem Europe and finally establish lasting peace and stability in that region:
- 
by closely watching developments in Kosovo, where some indigenous political forces are
clearly trying to force the creation of a mono-ethnic Kosovar Albanian state;
- 
through a continuous dialogue with the Governmsnt of Montenegro, which seems to be set on
gaining as much independsnce as possible from Serbia;
- 
through intensive discussions with all the countries in south-eastern Europe where the relevant
questions are being addressed in orderto arrive at appropriate solutions ttrat take account of
their ditrering and at times divergent interests;
through continuing support for the long overdue tansformation of the economy and urgently
needed institutional reform in Bomia and Herzegovina to turn it into a viable country that is
not forced to survive on foreign donations;
- 
through continuing support to MAPE's mission for restnrcturing and strengthening Albania's
police forces to enable them to carry out their priority task of fighting crime including
and arms and drugs trafficking;
by promoting closer cooperation through bilateral, filateral or multilateral arrangements
bstween the countries of the regron, thus encouraging them to take their destiny into their own
hands and preparing them for enhanced cooperation with the European Union, which in due
coruse should lead to their eventual accession to the European Union;
by pointing out firmly to relevant authorities that an early solution to the issue of missing
persons in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo deserves the highest priority, and that it
will contibute to easing the tension between the different ethnic groups in those areas;
3. Ask the European Union to provide in the very near future sufficient financial and human
resoruces to achieve the objectives of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mrs Durrieu and Mr Micheloyannis, Rapporteurs)
I. The state of affairs in Kosovo
1. Noturithstanding the up-beat assessments
of those who have visited Pristina recenfly, the
conflict ragrng until June 1999 caused wide-
spread destruction in Kosovo. At the moment,
there are still some 500 000 displaced persons
and, according to the European Commissior, ar-
ound 300 000 people facrng the possibility of
winter without adequate accommodation. Aid or-
ganisations estimate that about 120 000 houses 
-
half of the total number in Kosovo 
- 
have been
damaged in some way. The LINHCR says that it
will be able to repair 50 000 houses this winter.
Aid is coming inmore slowlythan expected.
2. The economy is in very bad shape, with an
industrial ffiastructrue that has become dilapi-
dated after texr years of neglect. The United Na-
tions administration has fallen behind in many
respects. Pledged donations are coming in very
slowly or not at all, and the UN has problems in
meding the cost of government including the
salaries of public employees.
3. The anbiguity of UN Security Resolution
1244 tasking LJNMIK to administer Kosovo
while preserving the fiction that the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the FRY are not af-
fected does nothing to ease the situation. Kosovo
has no tax systerq a provisional legal system is
being established because Kosovar Albanians re-
fuse to live under the legal system that prevails in
the FRY and Kosovo is acquiring many of the
attributes of sovereignty because Serbia is unable
to exercise sovereign rights over Kosovo, even if
these have not been abolished.
4. After his first visit to Kosovo in October
1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi fuman stated
that the United Nations was having difficulty
administering Kosovo because of the '"built-in
tension and considerable arnbiguity" of Security
Council Resolution 1244. He also maintained
that tension between the Kosovar Albanians, who
want an independent Kosovo, and the United
Nations, which is administering Kosovo as a self-
governing autonomous regron of Yugoslavia, will
mount as time goes byl. In his view, more re-
sources were needed for the UN administration in
Kosovo.
5. The anomalous position of Kosovo be-
c,Lme evsn more obvious when in September, the
United Nations established a customs service 
-
which has already begun to collect customs du-
ties 
- 
appointed a Supreme Court and began con-
sultations on drafting a legal framework for Kos-
ovo's economy and also adopted the Geman mark
as the official crurency of the province. Registra-
tion of the Kosovar populatiorq essential for the
organisation of democratic elections and the in-
troduction of social services and a ta( syste,rrL
started on I October.
6. In the following paragraphs, the situation
in Kosovo will be dealt with in more dstail.
(a) Adivities of IINMIK
and other interndional organisdions
(i) Main tasks
7. On l0 June 1999, the United Nations Se-
curity Council adopted Resolution 1244 puttng
an end to the NATO air strikes in Kosovo and
bringrng about an interim settle,ment. The resolu-
tion reaffirmed ttrat Kosovo was part of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) but also set
up UNMIK (the United Nations Interim Mission
in Kosovo) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a
security force under NATO authority.
8. KFOR's role is to supervise the withdraw-
al of Yugoslav forces and the demilitarisation of
Kosovo and to maintain public order until such
time as a police force and local civilian adminis-
tration are inplace. KFOR is essentially concem-
ed with security. It is there to prevent a new
explosion of hostilities and maintain public order
in Kosovo. The role of KFOR is discussed in fuIl
in a report of the Defence Commiuee (Document
1670).
9. UNMIK's task is to reshape and rebuild
Kosovo and prepare the province for elecrions
and possible autonomy. It is to operate in all
areas of civilian adminisfiation, from the police
to the banking system, from re-establishing the
postal and telecommunications service to organ-
ising elections. Working in partnership with the
population of Kosovo, LINMIK is responsible for1 International Herald Tribune,2l October 1999.
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carrying out basic administative functions and
supervising the setting up of independent demo-
cratic institutions on a provisional basis so as to
gru[antee all Kosovar citizens normal living con-
ditions in a climate of peace.
10. LINMIK comprises four sectors or "pil-
lars", corresponding to its four main tasks: civil-
ian administation, humanitarian support, demo-
cratisation and strengthening of institutions and
reconstmction. Four international organisations
are each responsible for one of these pillars and
are working together within LJNMIK. The civil-
ian adminisration is the direct responsibility of
the UN which has divided up Kosovo into five
sectors and appointed international civilian ad-
ministrators to each. The administrators have
power in the region and supervise the reintegra-
tion of staff into public institutions and the lat-
ter's smooth-runilng and modernisation. The Un-
ited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) coordinates the whole ra::ge of hu-
manitarian aid and emergency housing. The Or-
ganisation for Security and Cooperation in Eur-
ope is resporsible for dernocratisation and sremg-
thening institutions. Last but not leasf the Euro-
pean Union is in charge of reconstruction.
11. LJNMIK has considerable auttrority in
Kosovo as it holds ilre ultimate legislative and
executive power in the province. Thus until le-
gitimate local government can be set up follow-
ing free elections, UNMIK is the enrbodimsnt of
government and its role is to administer the pro-
vince and ensure compliance with ttre rule of law.
The Head of the Mission, former Frsnch Health
Minister Bemard Kouchner, is the Special Rep-
resentative of the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral and the highest-ranking civilian adminis-
trator in Kosovo. As Mr Kouchner explained to
the French newspaper Le Monde, the creation of
an administration which is de facto an autono-
mous governmsnt in Kosovo, albeit one located
within a sovereign state "is an awe-inspiring
taslg precisely because there are no precedents".
Kosovo is now in practice a UN proteciorate.
12. Herein lies the major contradiction in the
peace agreement. Resolution 1244 which put an
snd to hostilities confirms Yugoslavia's sover-
eipty over the whole of its territory and the in-
violability of its borders. At the same time it
establishes a de facto international protectorate
in Kosovo gr"ing the UN Special Representative
to all intents and purposes all the prerogatives of
sovereignty. This is a contadiction which in
practice raises an snormous amount of difficulty.
Kosovo is still part of Yugoslavia but that in
itself no longer means anything.
(ii) Establishing a legal system
13. Kosovo is a legal vacuum where the UN
has to rebuild a fair and independent legal sys-
tem.
14. On 25 July 1999, the UN administrator in
Kosovo, Bemard Kouchner, promulgated "Regu-
lationNo. l" orthe "Mother of Laws", providing
LJNMIK with a legal basis for the exercise of the
fuIl powers of government envisaged by United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. T\e
main points are as follows:
legal and executive powers in Kosovo,
including the a&ninistration of justice
are vested in UNMIK and exercised by
the Secretary-General's Special Repre-
ssntative;
- 
the Secretary4eneral's Special Repre-
sentative appoints whomsoever he sees
fiq with powil over them of subsequent
dismissal, to discharge the functions of
the civilian administration in Kosovo,
including judicial functions. Such du-
ties can be carried out in accordance
with the existing law and rules promul-
gated by {-NMIK;
in carrying out those duties, any person
with responsibility for a public function
or duties must not be guilty of dis-
crimination and must comply with in-
temationally recognised rules govern-
ing human rightr, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Liberties, and intemational
pacts on civil and political and econom-
ic, social and cultural rights;
- 
the laws that applied on Kosovar terri-
tory prior to 24 March 1999 continue
to apply, provided tlrey are not opposed
to the rules referred to above, the dis-
charge of UNMIK's mandate or any
regulation enacted by it;
in the exercise ofthe duties entrusted to
it, UNMIK may enact legislation in the
form of regulations. These will remain
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in force until repealed by UNMIK or
until the latter's replacement by insti-
tutions emanating from a political settle-
merfr in accordance with LJN Security
Council Resolution I 244;
UNMIK will administer movable and
immovable property, including bank
accounts and other property belonging
to the Fedeml Republic ofYugoslavia or
the Republic of Serbia, or any one of
their agents on the territory of Kosovo.
15. On 4 July, UNMIK released a declaration
recognising KFOR's right to stop and detain any
individual suspected of having mfirnged security
and public order, including the commission of
serious crime (murder, rape, kid.apping, arson
or war crimes). The declaration also recognised
the right of detainees to due process of law, in
other words the right to an early hearing before a
court and to access to counsel for the defence and
to their family. The present legal vacuum pre-
vents ssnt€,nce being passed on tlrose in detention.
16. One of UNMIK's first initiatives has
therefore been to start assexnbhng an indepen-
dent, multi-ethnic judiciary. As long ago as 1990,
the Belgrade regime replaced all Albanian judges
and public prosecutors with Serbs. The head of
UNMIK has appointed a Committee for Legal
Provisional Appointnents whose task it is to
make recommendations on provisional mags-
trates appointnents. This "Council of the'Wise"
comprises four Kosovar lawyers and magisfrates
(three Albanian and one Serb) and three re,pre-
sentatives of the international community. The
appointnent of judges and prosecutors recruited
from Kosovo's main ethnic communities has
begun tlroughout the province. In total 28 cir-
cuitjudges and prosecutors have been appointed
for a ttree-month probationary period. Four
judges are Serbs, one is a gypsy, another a Turk-
ish speaker, a seventh is a Muslim Slavonic
speaker and the remaining 2l are Albanian. The
fact ttrat certain Serb magisfrates remain in post
is a major irritant but the United Nations, armed
with its mandate, has started as it means to go
on. Other appointnents are expected. The first
task of the appointees when in place will be to
travel around Kosovo fiolding sessions to investi-
gate individual cases of suspected crime by
KFOR detainees.
17. There is much to be done, particularly in
re-establishing the Supreme Court of Kosovo (re-
moved in 1990), drawing up training progr:Im-
mes in national and intemational law and mod-
enrising Kosovo's prison system to bring it up to
intemational human rights standards.
18. UNMIK must also deal with other legal
problems of the utnost importance to Kosovo's
urtire populatio4 for example, the issue of iden-
tity cards and other personal documents such as
passports and driving licences destroyed by the
Serbs during the war, in the absence of which
travel outside Kosovo other than to Albania is
impossible. It also has to set up an office to reg-
ister applications for restitution ofproperty and a
6ilrrnal with responsibility for examining dis-
putes in this area.
19. However, after years of subordinatiorq it is
not only necessary to restore an independent
judicial system but also to ame,nd Yugoslav law,
used as a weapon by Serb nationalists against the
Kosovars. To retain the Serb penal code 
- 
a sym-
bol of oppression 
- 
is conseque,ntly entirely unac-
ceptable. Proposals have bee,n advanced to re-
instate the Kosovo code withdrawn by Belgrade
in 1990 and supplement it with the Yugoslav
code revised in line with intemational standards,
as was done by Croatia and Bosnia.
20. Referring to the charged situatioq ttre
Secretary{eneral's Represe,ntative said:'"This
was a new beginning for Kosovo: the law had
changed". The intention was to calm unrest aris-
ing out of Section 4 of Rule One which stated
that the laws tlrat applied in Kosovo pior to 24
March 1999 remained in force. This was inter-
preted by Kosovars as keeping in place Yugoslav
laws which had in practice been an insrument of
Serb repression in the province. A working
group, attended by international experts, is ttrere-
fore in the process of drawing up a body of law
which is neither Serb nor Yugoslav. The work is
being coordinated by ttre Council of Europe,
which is to begin by cleaning up the existing laws
- 
although the more glaring abuses, like the sec-
tion forbidding Albanians and no one else from
entering into property transactions, were done
away with on the spot.
21. A human rights ageincy is to be set up in
Kosovo, whose task it will be to deal wittr com-
plaints concerning any form of abuse of power
on the part of the civilian interim administration,
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local institutions and any other persons claiming
to exercise any form of authority. This "ombuds-
man" service must be empowered to conduct en-
quiries followrng human rights violations on the
part of any individual or body in Kosovo and
take measures to bring about their redress.
22. The lnternational War Crimes Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia is empowered to deal
with all matters connected with inter-communal
violence, be they acts of abuse perpetrated by
Serbs or Albanians.
23. Too many of those who have committed
war crimes or crimes against humanity are still at
large. They will have to be alrested and they will
have to account for their crimes before the tribu-
na1 in The Hague. If justice is not done, recon-
ciliation will be very difficult and the danger will
be that indiscriminate acts of vengeance continue
to poiscm relations between differertr ethnic groups.
(iii) A new currency
24. A provision enacted on 3 Septernber 1999
by the LJN administation in Kosovo made the
German mar\ already in wide circulation, Kos-
ovo's official currency. At the same time it dis-
couraged the use of the Yugoslav dinar, without
however making it illegal. LINMIK levies a ta:r
on tlrose who insist on payme,lrt in dinars. Any
other curencies may be used but the German
mark is the official crurency of the provisional
administration and international organisations for
customs palments and public accounts. The leg-
islation on the crursncy follows and supplemelrts
UNMIK's introduction of customs duties at the
borders of FYROM andAlbania.
(iv) The creation of a police force
25. The United Nations, NATO, the European
Union and the OSCE all acknowledge that Kos-
ovo's immediate priority has to be security.
26. UNMIK's civilian police force has been
given two essential tasks. The first is progres-
sively to take over police frrnctions carried out by
KFOR and temporary law enforcemexil.
27. All in all, IINMIK will deploy 3 100 Un-
ited Nations civilian police officers in Kosovo for
the interim period but at the end of October 1999
only I 700 were in place. Mr Kouchner had ask-
ed for over 5 000. IJNMIK's civilian police force
includes groups of special officers which fulfil
given public order functions, such as crowd con-
tol. In the initial phase, although KFOR is res-
ponsible for security and public order, UNMIK's
international civilian police force advises KFOR
on its civilian policing functions and makes con-
tact with local communities.
28. UNMIK's second civilian policing task,
following the example of Bosnia, is to create a
compstent and impartial Kosovar police force
trained to have a democratic outlook. It therefore
immediately began setting up the Kosovo police
force, whose applicants are drawn from among
the people of Kosovo, in consultation with the
OSCE, and are rqlresentative of all the area's
ethnic comrunities. A first mntingertr of 176 Koso-
varpolicemerq including 8 Serbs, graduated from
the newly created police academy on 16 October
1999.
29. Another problem has been that of how to
integrate into the future civilian police force
thousands of Kosovo Liberation Army me,mbers.
In the eyes of some this is an immediate means of
bringing them under control and then of getting
rid of the less cooperative elements. However,
others fear that LJNMIK might in this way be
training a dedicated KLA armed mititia" with the
risk of destabilisation ttrat this entails for the
fuuue when KFOR is no longer present. There
are also different opinions as to the form the
police force should take. The KLd the sole force
to do battle with the Serbs prior to the allied
bombings, feels it has won the right to independ-
ence and the various symbols of state sovereignty
of which the army is one. Its leaders would like
the force to resemble as closely as possible a
fledgling anny, while the UN and KFOR are lay-
rng ma:<imum emphasis on its civilian character.
30. After three months of negotiations on the
status of the Kosovo Corps, the signature of the
KLA demilitarisation agreement on 20 Septem-
ber 1999 nevertheless represented a milestone in
UN action or the end of one era and the begin-
ning of another 
- 
according to General Jaclson.
The Kosovo Protection Colps (KPC) was born
out of the ashes of the KLA. Founded by decree
of Bernard Kouchner, the force is intended to
become a civilian emergency seryice whose ac-
tivity is under the day-today supervision of
KFOR. Classified as multi-ethnic, the Kosovo
Protection Corps must be l0% constituted from
Kosovo's sthnic minorities, including Serbs. The
Corps consists of a maximum of 5 000 uni-
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formed officers, 2 000 of them reserves. Its func-
tions are to provide protection against disasters,
a search and rescue service, humardtarian assis-
tance in isolated areas and assistance in mine
clearance operations and to help rebuild com-
munications networks and villages. The KPC has
a rapid reaction unit and a guards unit, and back-
up services such as engineering and commun-
ications. According to KFOR, the Kosovo Pro-
tection Corps is a strictly civilian organisation. It
will not be a defence force, will certainly not be
an army and will play no role whatsoever in
maintaining law and order.
31. The KPC units that are currenfly opera-
tional are provisional units. The rigorous selec-
tion procedure for KPC officers will not be com-
pleted until mid-November. By the end of Nov-
ember 1999, the KPC will be multi-ethnic right
up to the level of command posts.
32. The KPC will have a pennane,lil arsenal of
750 weapons, including 200 Kalashnikov assault
rifles and its members, under KFOR supervision,
are able to make use of I 800 other weapons.
These figures are three times higher than those
put forward by NATO during the negotiations.
However, according to one UN senior official,
the former KLA still has 100 000 weapons in its
possession. Uniforms, pistols and a quasi-mili-
tary chain of comrnand have meant ttrat Serbia
has had a field day in criticising a Kosovo Pro-
tection Corps that appears to be none ottrer than
the KLAby a different name.
(b) Politicalforces in Kosoyo
33. In accordance with UN Security Council
Resolution 1244, which e,lrvisages "pending a
final settlement", the "establishment of substan-
tial autonomy and self-governmsnt in Kosovo",
democratic institutions are now being developed.
Political movements and forces, some of which
came into being as early as the 1980s, are posi-
tioning themselves, in an envirorunent of confu-
sion, with an eye to the forthcoming democratic
elections. The present political spectrum is wide-
ftmging, somewhat confusing and still subject to
change. Moreovel the parties, generally speak-
rng, do not have much of a political progfttmme 
-
apart from the overriding objective of independ-
snce for Kosovo, sooner or later. Alttrough it has
now been disbanded, mention is made here of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UQK), not
only because, through its armed operations, the
movemsnt has forced the international commu-
nity to become actively involved in Kosovo, but
also because its leaders have played a major role
in forming a provisional governmsnt and provi-
sional local authorities. After the Serbian troops
and police forces withdrew, the people welcomed
the KLA as their liberation movement but this
image was soon tarnished by the many disgrace-
firl criminal and violent acts committed by people
claiming to represe,ntthe KLA.
34. At present the main political parties in
Kosovo are:
- 
the Pa4y for Democratic Progress of
Kosovo, founded in October 1999 by
Hashim Thaci, former political chief of
ttre now disbanded KLA. This new par-
ty does not necessarily have the support
of all former KLA members and sup-
porters. When the KLA began its arm-
ed struggle against Serbian rule, many
joined this movement without giving up
their allegiance to their own political
party or organisation. Almost immed-
iately after the armed stmggle had ach-
ieved the withdrawal of the Serbian
army and police forces and a provis-
ional settlement the KLA started to
split up into differem factions. The pop-
ularity of former KLA menrbers with
the populace is diminishing in view of
the high-handed assumption of power
by KLA representatives in cities and
municipalities all over the province;
- 
the Dsmocratic League of Kosovo
(LDK) founded in 1989 under the lead-
ership of its President, Ibrahim Rugo-
va. In 1995, Bujar Bukoshi, Prime
Minister of the LDK parallel govern-
ment who had collected money from
the Kosovar Albanian diaspora for his
"government's" activities, broke off ties
with President Rugova. Many others
left the LDK when the fightng started
in early 1998. After the end of hostil-
ities in early June 1999, Mr Rugova
returned to Pristin4 although not until
early August. It seems that there is still
considerable support for the LDK, not
only because ofits sound experience in
organising seryices and activities for
10
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the population during the years of
passive resistance, but also because the
rival KLA made mistakes and showed
signs of abusrng power by its appro-
priation of all the important positions in
June 1999. The unofficial election of a
Kosovar Parliamerf in March 1998 gave
the LDK the largest nrunber of seats
and representation to three other par-
ties: the Social Democratic Party, the
Albanian Christian Democratic Party
of Kosovo and the Liberal Party. The
LDK did not join the provisional gov-
ernmsnt sst up at Rarnbouillet nor the
Transitional Council as established un-
der UNMIK provisions, where it has
two seats;
the United Democratic Movement was
formed in 1998 as a coalition of seven
parties, led by Rexhep Qosja. It main-
tained good relations with the KLA as
it then was and some of its more pro-
minent members sit in the provisional
goverunent. The United Democratic
Movement is also represented on the
Transitional Council. One of its comp-
onsnts is the Parliamentary Party of
Kosovo, founded by Velon Surroi and
currently led by Bajram Kosumi. The
United Democratic Movemertr still needs
to be transformed into a single, stable
movsment, and it is not clear that this
is happenrng as yet in view of the re-
casting of the various parties now tak-
ing place;
the People's Movem€rlt of Kosovo.
This movsmsnt was established as ear-
ly as 1982, based on various commun-
ist splinter groups. In its early days, it
had the support of Enver Hoxha's
regime in Albania and the liberation of
Kosovo from Serbia and a Greater Al-
bania were its political objectives. Now-
adays, the People's Movement of Kos-
ovo is virrually nonrxistent, but it was
the breeding ground for many promin-
ent politicians who later joined the
KLA or established the Christian Dem-
ocratic Party;
the Christian Democratic Party was
formed in July 1999 and is presantly
under the leadership of Bardhyl Matr-
muti, Foreign Minister of the provi-
sional govenrment. Many of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party members came
from the KLA or the People's Move-
ment of Kosovo, but public declara-
tions by the party leadership contain
less radical language than those ofthe
ottrertwo movements;
- 
the National Movement for tlre Libera-
tion of Kosovo, led by Valon Murati.
Two of its members are in tlre provi-
sional govemmsnt and practically all
have been meinbers of the KLA.
Transitional Council
35. In order to involve the people of Kosovo in
the administration and conaol of the province,
LJNMIK has established a Transitional Council,
with a multi-ethnic menrbership and advisory and
consultative authority. Membership of the Coun-
cil is as follows: two KLA represe,ntatives, two
United Democratic Movement representatives,
two LDK representatives, two Independents, two
Serbs and two other minority representatives
(one Bosnian and one Turk).
36. The Transitional Council held its first
meeting on 16 July 1999, but has not been a
great zuccess. The LDK under Ibrahim Rugova
did not want to join the Council because it did
not agree wittr its mernbership, arguing that as
the KLA and United Derrocratic Movernent were
in alliance, they were over-rqlrese,nted, and that
the Christian Dsmocrats should be included. The
Council has nevertheless mst several times with
the LDK present because Mr Rugova did not
want to give the impression of boycotting it.
Recenfly, the two Serb representatives on ttre
Council, Bishop futemije and Momcilo Traj-
kovic, refused to participate in further Council
meetings, on the grounds that ttrey could no long-
er repressnt the increasingly radical views of the
Serb community in Kosovo.
Provi si onal Gov ernment
37. The three Kosovar Albanian political move-
merts repressnted at the Ra:nbouiilet talks in
February 1999, the KLA LDK and the United
Democratic Movement signed an agreement on
23 February 1999 to establish a provisional gov-
emment which would represent the Kosovar Al-
banian population until elections could be held.
ll
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The provisional govemment was established on
2 April 1999 withHashim Thaci as Prime Minis-
ter, but Ibratrim Rugova and the LDK have re-
fused to take up their seats as ministers in ig
argurng that a too narrow section ofthe popula-
tion is rqrresented and that it therefore lacks leg-
itimacy and authority.
38. UNMIK's official policy is not to recog-
nise the self-appointed governme,nt of Kosovo
but to set itself up as a s€,parate authority and
create its own services at ttre "national" level. It
is, however, maintaining some form of unofficial
relationship with menrbers of the provisional
governmexft. uNMIKls relationship with local
authorities is more complicated.
39. Immediately after its establishment in exile
just after the start of the NATO air strikes, the
provisional government under Hashim Thaci
started to plan for the setting-up of local authori-
ties. Once the conflict had endd these were in-
stalled within days of the entry of KFOR troops
into Kosovo. These local authorities were instal-
ledn?l of Kosovo's 29 municipalities. The two
remaining municipalities have a Serb majority.
All of their mayors had been active in Kosovar
Albanian politics before, mostly in the LDK, but
without exception they had joined the KLA when
the dispute with the Serbs tumed violent in 1998.
They are tryrng to provide arx a&ninistrative
framework for the reconstnrction of life at local
level. As these provisional municipalities have no
income, they try to collect money in various ways
and there are freque,nt reports of people being
presswised to make contributions. The pro-
visional authorities tend not to be able to provide
what people need most 
- 
help with reconstruction
- 
but they are a usefirl source of knowledge and
expertise. Many citize,ns, however, have serious
complain* about ttre system of collection of
contributions or ta:<es. They point out in par-
ticular that contributions are being gathered un-
systematically and unfairly and that they see no
visible results in return for their contributions.
Others agree with the LDK's argument that tlre
present provisional local authorities do not rep-
resent the entire political spectrum. It should,
however, be noted tlat in many self-appointed
local administrations, qualified people across the
political spectrum are carrying out their func-
tions without reference to any particular party
line.
40. UNMIK is now confronted with the diffi-
cult task of rurming the municipalities in imple-
mentation of its mandate 'to provide transitional
adminisfration while establishing and overseeing
the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions" (LIN Security Council Re-
solution 1244, parugraph 10). TJNMIK's admin-
istrators arrived months after the KLA repre-
sentatives, with little clear guidance, and they
zuffer from lack of funds and a shortage of staff.
AlthouglL officially, LJNMIK does not recognise
the self-appointed mayors and their staffs, in
most cases it has no choice otlrer than to accept
their presence and try and make the best of
things. Ithas also setup local advisoryboards on
which representatives of relevant local political
forces sit.
(c) The situation of ahnic minoritics in Kosovo
41. The international organisations running
Kosovo are trying to keep up ttre prete,nce of a
multi-ethnic society. tn reality, the ethnic minori-
ties prese,nt in Kosovo, in particular Serbs,
Roms, and Goranis (Muslim Slavs) are subjectto
harassmenq ki[urgs and other acts of revenge
and ethnic hatred. They are still being evicted
daily from their homes by Kosovar Albanians
who for the most part set their houses on fire to
make sure that tlrey do not come bacP. Over 50
Serb Orthodox churches have been desroyed
since June 1999. Many Serbs and Roms have left
Kosovo, although KFOR troops try to protect
them as best as they can. Estimates of the num-
ber of Serbs still living in Kosovo vary from
20 000 to 90 000, while KIOR puts the total
number of other minorities at some
7s 000.
42. Feeling threatened by the continuing at-
tacks on the remaining Serb population and
seemingly also in response to ttre creation of the
Kosovo Protection Corps largely made up of ex-
KLA members, Serb representatives in Kosovo
decided, on l8 October, to establish a Serb Pro-
tection Corps (Srpski Zastitni Korpus, SZK).
They also came out in favour of the creation of
2 A report on minorities in Kosovo released by
UNMI</OSCE in early November 1999 prwided the
following figures on criminal acs against ethnic min-
orities or moderate Kosovar Albanians benreen June
and Noverber 1999: 348 murders, 116 kidnappings,
1 070 lmtings and I 106 cases of arson.
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Serb cantons in Kosovo, but this idea, which
nms counter to a multi-ethnic Kosovo, has found
no support with LINMIK.
43. The tansformation of the KLA futo a Kos-
ovo Protection Corps (KPC) provoked a bitter re-
action among the Serbian community in Kosovo.
Its t'wo representatives withdrew from the Trans-
itional Council on 22 Oclober alleging ttrat the
KPC was a military force and a continuation of
the KLA under a new name.
44. On 24 October 1999, Kosovar Serbs es-
tablished a Serb National Council of 49 delegates
with Bishop Atemije as President of the Council
and Momcilo Trajkovic as head of the Executive
Board. The Council's objective was to protect
the remaining Serbs in Kosovo and help create
conditions for the return of those Serbs who were
forced out. A week late1 Mr Trajkovic w:ls
wounded at the door of his aparftnsnt in an attack
by Albanian gunmert'.
45. A joint report issued by the OSCE and
UNHCR in early November 1999 described the
situation as "a climate of violence and impunity".
Officials stated that there was growing evidence
ttrat forces in ttre Kosovar Albanian leadership
were encouraging the formation of a mono-ethnic
statea.
(d) Mkskg persons
46. In Kosovo, as in BosniE there is a missing
persons problem that needs urgsnt resolution.
The International Committee of the Red Cross
has a list of some I 900 Kosovar Albanian pris-
oners in Serbia" most of them arrested during the
Nato air strikes betwesn March and June 1999
and taken to Serbia just before KFOR entered
Kosovo. Their fate is now being investigated.
Thousands more are missing and may have been
killed. According to Kosovar human rights and
prisoners' associations, there are befween 5 000
and 7 000 missing persons still unaccounted for.
In early November 1999, the Prosecutor for the
LIN Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda, Ms Carla Del Ponte, reported
lhat2108 bodies had besn exhumed from graves
dug during the Serb operations against Kosovar
Albanians. She said that a total of l1 334 Koso-
var Albanians had been reported as missing and
3 Financial Times,2Novedbq 1999.
a lnternational Herald Tribune, 6-7 Noverber 1999.
believed dead. It is obvious that the problem of
missing persons must be dealt with as a matter of
the highest priority as its solution is essential for
the improvement of inter-sthnic relations in Kos-
ovo.
(e) Thefuture of Kosovo
47. The problem of Kosovo and its future sta-
tus cannot be left to chance by the counties that
have sponsored UN Security Council Resolution
1244.In any solution reached, the credibihry of
Europe, the United States and NATO in partic-
ular is at stake. The present situation in Kosovo
could degenerate into the establishment de facto
of a mono-ethnic state, not'nittrstanding the fact
that the very reason why the West went to war
was to defend the existence of a multi-ethnic one.
48. The overwhelming majority of Kosovar
Albanians leave no doubt as to the fact that their
political objective is an independerf Kosovo.
Although the choice betwesn a multi-ethnic stat€,
a mono-etlnic state and a further division of
Kosovo into Serbian and Kosovar Albanian enti-
ties is there in theory, they know that arguments
in favour of the latter two options will fall on
deaf ears.
49. The idea of a "Greater Albania" including
Albania and those parts of Kosovo, Montenegro,
Serbia and FYROM inhabited by ethnic Alban-
ians is viewed differently according to the indi-
vidual or political party in question and the inter-
ests at sake. It also depends on whether one has
in mind a cultural and ethnic Albanian corrmu-
nity, or Albania as a political entity. In their dis-
cussions with foreigners, the Kosovar Albanian
leaders prefer to treat Greater Albania as a rather
vague notion. They maintain that the unification
of all Albanians is not what they have in mind
and for the time being ttreir preoccupations lie
elsewhere. It is clear that in general terms they
want to be reassuring about this particular sub-
ject so as not to spoil the chances of discussions
taklng place on what ilrey see as the more urgent
problem of possible independence for Kosovo.
The Albanian Government considers the idea of a
Greater Albania an outnoded idea which is both
utopian and unrealistic. Mr Berisha's opposition
parfy, however, does not rule out the possibility
of a "federation of free Albanians in the Bal-
kans" if Albanians' rights are not respected5.
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50. The hypothesis of an independent Kosovo
is a source of division among the intemational
community, at a time when KFOR is warning the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) against any
attempt to form an army 
- 
one of the sovereign
attributes of a state. Russia, a taditional ally of
Serbia, has tlreatened to withdraw its troops
from Kosovo if the province were to move to-
wards independence. The Serbs are ttre more con-
cemed in view of the fact that the Americans do
not seem to be categorically opposed to the idea
of independence although the attitude taken by
many European countries, including France, is
far more reticent if not hostile. The mere m€xl-
tion of the word referendunL a prelude to a re-
cognised state of independence, is enoughto send
shudders down the spine of UN diplomats who
fear that the Kosovo precedent might be invoked
by the Kurds or Tibet.
51. Neither independent in law, nor Yugoslav
in practice, Kosovo occupies a unique position in
modern history; it is a "terra incognita". The sit-
uation created in Kosovo is unprecedented and
cannot be compared with any traditional system.
Time and practice will clariff its feasibilrty.
52. There can be no lasting solution without
consulting the people of Kosovo. The long-term
objective is more political than legal or humani-
tarian. Far from being confined to guaranteeing
security, peace and justice in Kosovq the task
that is set entails nothing less than bringing an
entire region into the European fold by meam of
a daring plan for its moral and material restora-
tion under European Union auspices with the aim
of establishing democracy, lasting peacq stabil-
ity and security.
II. The state of affairs
in neighbouring stotes
(a) Albania
(i) Political sifitati on
53. Developments in Albania have bee,n dis-
cussed in many previous Assemrbly reports and
ttre present re,port ttrerefore refers only briefly to
events in tlrat cormtry between l99l and July
1999.
54. Since the first multi-party elections in
1991, Albania has been undergoing a slow and
painfirl process of political and economic traxs-
formation.
55. The 1991 elections, leading to a Commu-
nist Party ,i"tory, were soon followed by mas-
sive public unrest and the new elections n 1992
that brought Sali Berisha and his Democratic
Party to power. In the elections held in 1996, the
Democratic Party was again victorious but the
elections were declared frauduleirt by the OSCE
and intemational observers. The opposition par-
ties, who had boycotted the voting also boycotted
the new parliament. In March 1997, the scandal
of the collapse of the higtrly popular pyramid
investnent schemes led to total chaos all over the
country. European allies helped the Governmelrt
rerstablish order by sending in a European force
(Operation Alba) from May to August 1997,
followed by the WEU MAPE mission to help
rebuild a national police force. Several counties,
headed by Greece and Italy, provided assistance
through bilateral progzmlmes.
56. Fresh elections in June 1997 brought Fatos
Nano's Socialist Party of Albania to power with
101 seats in the 155-seat parliament. Rexhep
Mejdani succeeded Sali Berisha as the country's
President. It was now the turn of Mr Berisha's
Democratic Pa4y, with 29 seats, to boycott Parl-
iament's activities. The assassination of Azem
Adja{ a well-lnovm Dsmocratic Party politician
in September 1998, led once again to violsnt
street riots and an atempted coup.
57. Although the Governme,lrt survived the
coup, Fatos Nano had to resign as Prime Minis-
ter and was succeeded by Pandeli Majko. In July
1999, the Democratic Party finally decided to
end its boycott of parliament. More recently, in-
tenral party strife and power struggles have again
got the upper hand in both Mr Nano's Socialist
Party and Sali Berisha's Democratic Pa4y. At
the Socialist Party Congress on 9-10 Oaober
1999, IVIr Nano defeated Mr Majko in a contest
for the party leadership and on 26 October, Mr
Nano prevailed upon Mr Majko to resign as
Prime Minister. Two days later, Ilir Meta, who is
close to Mr Majko, was appointed Prime Minis-
ter.
58. At the same time, Mr Berisha has been
working to tighten his grrp on his own Demo-
cratic Party. He was re-elected Party Chairman
at the snd of Septernber 1999 after Genc Pollo
gave in to strong pressure and withdrew his can-
didacy a day before ttre Parry Congress. In early
October, Mr Berisha proceeded to replace Mr
l4
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Pollo in the role of Chairman of the Dsmocratic
Party's parliamentary group with Jsmin Gjarq
one of his own loyal supporters and Mr Pollo's
successor as Deputy Chairman ofthe Democratic
Party. This was challenged by Mr Pollo and
other Democratic Pa4y parliamentarians, who
oppose Mr Berisha's policies.
59. [n short Fatos Nano and Sali Berisha are
doing their utrnost to regain and consolidate their
hold over their respective parties. These two
leaders dominate the political scene and ttreir
failure to agree could again cause destabilisation.
60. The chaos of spnng 1997 deah a severe
".blow to a country already considered the least
developed in the region. Albania faces many
problems. The county's police and anned forces
have virtuallyto be rebuilt from scratch, criminal
gangs control large tracts ofthe country and the
economy is in a state of disnrption.
61. Pandeli Majko's appointnent as Prime
Minister, in Septernber 1998, gave rise to new
hope for much-needed reconsffuction of Albania.
Mr Majko was one of the leaders of the student
protest movernent, which had played an impor-
tant role in the demise of the Communist regime
in 1991.
62. Prime Minister Majko's Government faced
the same confrontational attitude from Mr Beri-
sh4 although a number of Democratic Party pol-
iticians, understanding that zuch behaviour stood
in the way of political and economic renewal,
have beeir more supportive. The Government
succeeded in gethng the new Constitution ap-
provd but very soon after its fresh start, found
itself completely overwhekned by the conse-
quences ofthe Kosovo conflict.
63. Although the border bstween Albania and
Kosovo had for some time been a crossing-point
for arms bound for Kosovo and refugees for
Albania" the situation changed radically once the
NATO air sfrikes began. Northem Albania be-
came a base for KLA fighters and an arsenal for
weapons for the armed struggle in Kosovo while
hundreds of thousands of refugees sought shelter
inAlbania.
64. Albania was not able to cope with the in-
flux of refugees whiclL at its heighg numbered
some 500 000 Kosovar Albanians. The Govern-
ment called for foreign assistance and offered frrll
cooperation, and with the help of NATO, the
LJNHCR and other intemational and national
bodies, the refugee problan was kept under con-
trol. The many security problems in the northern
border ruea 
- 
incursions by Serbian forces into
Albanian territory, clashes between various arm-
ed Kosovar Albanian factions and the activities
of Albanian armed gaxgs 
- 
have also been man-
aged in such a way as not to further destabilise
the country.
65. As a resulq Albania has shown that with
forergn assistance 
- 
which it could not have done
without 
- 
it is cohesive and resilient enough to
survive a crisis with all the ingredients for major
destabilisation of the country. For the presen!
however, Albania has more to do ttran simply
survive. It must now live up to its role in the
region and make its own contibution to peace
and stability there.
66. The country is already offering NATO fuIl
cooperation and there is a standing NATO pres-
ence there of around 2 000 toops which is also
supporting Communicatiot Zone West. As re-
gards Kosovo, the Albanian Government has let
it be known drat its first priority is to normalise
the situation in that part of the world. Not until
Resolution 1244 is implemented frrlly and demo-
cratic institutions and some form of self-govern-
msnt are in operatiorq is there likely to be a need
for further assessment.
67. Albania has no aspirations in the direction
of a Greater Albania and regards the idea of an
Albanian Federation in the region as utopian and
unrealistic. Resolution 1244 leaves open the final
decision as to Kosovo, but in Albania's view, the
only long-term solution for peace and security is
integration of the whole reglon of south-eastern
Europe into the European Union. The Albanian
Government is aware that it has a responsibility
to strengthen the role of dsmocratic institutions
and to transcend policies based on individual in-
terests.
68. However, this opinion is apparently not
entirely shared by the opposition. Sali Berish4
Chairman of the opposition Democratic Party of
Albania, speaking at his party's national convsn-
tion on 30 September 1999, said that if racism
against the Albanians could not be prevsnted, it
was highly likely that the latter, as an act of na-
tional self-protection and in dialogue and coop-
eration with the Wes! would throw their weight
15
DOCUMENT 1666
behind the creation of a Federation of Free A1-
banians in the Balkans6.
69. The Government sees the fight against all
forms of criminality, including smuggling and
arms and drugs trafficking, as one of its most
important tasks. Recently, Albanian police crack-
ed down effectively on 32 criminal gangs which
were terrorising certain regions and not only con-
trolling the local economy, but also challenging
the police. According to the Minister of Public
Order, crime fell by 50% in 1999 as compared to
1998. Rapid intervention forces will receive a
part of their taining in the United States and be
issued with suitable equipment. Anti-terrorist
police units will also receive training abroad.
70. On other key issues, progress has been
made but much remains to be done in terms of
infrastructural development legal and institution-
al reforn, transformation of the economy and re-
structuring and reinforcing the armed forces and
police forces.
71. At the same time, however, the Albanian
Government is conscious ttrat inter-state relations
based on policies of good neighbourliness and
cooperation are extremely important for peace
and stability in the regron. In the discussiors of
the Working Tables of the Stabillty Pact for
Souttr-Eastern Europe, Albania has therefore
proposed the establishmsrf of a customs union
between Albania" Bulgaria and FYROM.
(ii) The mission of the Multinational Advisory
Police Element MAPE)
72. The establishment of MAPE by WEU at
the request of the European Union and its devel-
opment since has been discussed in earlier As-
sembly reportsT. The present report provides an
update of the most recent developments with
regard to MAPE's mission.
73. Over ttre past two years, MAPE has as-
sessed the operational capabilities of Albanian
police units and tailored training needs accord-
ingly. An initial evaluation of personnel and lo-
gistic aspects has been carried out in most of the
4l Commissariats. To date, l0 of the 12 Direc-
torates have been assessed. Last March, tlre sec-
ond MAPE traimng centre opened in Durres in
5 Democratic Pa4y of Albani4 Press release, Timn4 15
fuober 1999.
7 SeeassemblyDocuments 1609,1627 and 1653.
premises renovated with EU funds. Basic train-
ing curricula and manuals developed by MAPE
are now ready for use in Albanian police training
programmes. Apart from basic training in Tir-
ana, MAPE's training efforts now also focus on
various specialised areas in Durres as well as
fietd trarning that MAPE's mobile teams provide
directly in the units out in the country. Of the 12
Directorates, 10 have received field training. To
date, over 3 000 police officers have bee,n trained
in the training centres in Tirana and Durres and
in the field. This includes some 35% of rapid
reaction forces and 40%o of border police.
74. A key part of MAPE's work has been to
provide advice to the Ministry of Public Order on
restructuring the Albanian police. The draft state
police law recenfly approved by the goverrunent
and forwarded to Parliament was drawn up with
support by MAPE and other intemational or-
ganisations. It contains the foundations for build-
ing a democratic police force operating to inter-
nationally accepted standards. Today, MAPE is
assisting the Mrnisnry of Public Order in prepar-
ing the implementation of the police law, once
ratified. Furthermore, a coherent package of as-
sistance is being drawn up in liaison wit[ and
complementary to, the bilateral assistance pro-
grammes which are active inthis field.
75. MAPE is also engaged in promoting co-
herence in training-related activities with other
multilateral and bilateral donors, to avoid dupli
cation of resources. WEU is therefore strongly
committed to the coordinating framework estab-
lished by the EU and OSCE in the form of the
meetings of the Friends of Albania which has
already had very good results in reinforcing co-
ordination and cooperation. WEU is planning to
organise a special sub-group meeting of the
Friends of Albania" at a suitable time to be dis-
cussed withthe EU and OSCE.
76. Most rece,ntly, the conflict in Kosovo and
the associated refugee crisis placed an unex-
pected and severe strain on the Albanian authori-
ties. With the help of ad hoc contributions from
WEU nations in ttre forrn of both police equip-
ment and temporary augmentation of MAPE per-
sormel MAPE was able to provide advicg and
support the Albanian police in facing tlrc chal-
lenges ofthis crisis.
77. It has been ernphasised that WEU's com-
mitrnent to Albania is not merely for the short
16
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term. [n a ge,neral sense, that message is rein-
forced by the work on the Stabilrty Pact and
more specifically by the EU in launching work on
a new contractual relationship with Albania.
WEU has regularly renewed its mandates for
MAPE by means of twelve-month increments.
Since spring this year, its mission in Albania has
besn conducted with considerable fundrng from
the EU.
78. Since July 1999, MAPE has been operat-
ing under a new operational plan. Training and
advice are now given in the whole country and
down to police unit level. Field Advisory Train-
ing Teams GAm) have been dispatched to
Shkodr4 More and Grokaster. They are carry-
ing out traimng and advisory tasks at Directorate
and Commissariat level in these areas which are
in particular need of support and assistance. Pos-
itive results of the new sfiategy have already
besn observed in Shkodra.
79. Accordingly, MAPE is being extended
from the currsnt strength of 143 in Albania to
170. At the same time, it is WEU's intention
progressively to hand over the training fi:nction
to the Albanian authorities thernselves, hence the
stress on "train-the-trainers prograrnmes". A sig-
nificant part of the raining is therefore already
being done joinfly by the Albanian and MAPE
instructors.
80. Ultimately, the primary responsibility for
organising and taining their police forces will lie
with the Albanian authorities tJrmselves. WEU's
cooperation with its counterparts in Albania is
close but there are still important tasks to be
done. In the coming months, MAPE will work
with the Albanian authorities to make improve-
msnts in the selection of studeirts and to ensure
that officers frained by WEU are rewarded in
their careers, deployed to appropriate duty sta-
tions, and retained for a sufficiently long period
to ensure their training has the desired impact.
Most important however, is early ratification of
the State Police Bill which will give MAPE the
proper legal basis for continuing its work.
(b) Bonia and Eerzegovina
81. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina is far
less prominent in the media than previously, hav-
ing been displaced by other more newsworthy
regions where human slaughter is taking place as
television audiences watch from their armchairs,
the situation in that counbry still gives cause for
concem.
82. The picture of developments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is bleak, as described by NATO
Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, on the occa-
sion of his first official visit to the country on 21
October 1999.
83. Lord Robertson repeated what had beeir
said by almost every other official on numy pre-
vious occasions: "The problem of comrption
must be tackled and there must be more progress
with the crucial reform of the judiciary and the
police. There have been some refugee retums,
particularly to minority areas, but most of the
retums have bee,n to the territory of the Federa-
tion... There is a Standing Commiuee on Military
Matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina which has
been slowly, one might say much too slowly,
getflng to grips with merging the Entity Armed
Forces. But recently, some progress has besn
made and a secretadat has been established".
These comments were made four years after the
Dayton Peace Agreement took effect.
84. Jacques KlerU Coordinator of UN opera-
tions in Bosnia and Herzegovina said recenflyE
thatthe main problem he was faced with was the
continuing fragmentation of the Bomians into
small ethnic communities. Hardline separatists
are still trying to thwart the objectives of the
Dayton Peace Agreement and, on 18 October
1999, President Tudjman of Croatia even called
for the creation of a Bosnian Croat entity.
85. Both Wolfgang Petritsclq who replaced
Carlos Westendorp as High Represerfiative, and
Robert Barry, Head of the OSCE Mission in
Bomia and Herzegovina" have recenfly empha-
sised the urgsnt need for continued support in
stabilising the county. A foreign military pres-
snce is still indispensable in terms of its internal
security; however, as part of a rationalisation
effort 
- 
but also because many of the participat-
ing countries have problems provirling enough
troops as they are also malong a contribution to
the 50 000-stong KFOR 
- 
NATO defence min-
isters have decided to cut back SFOR from the
current 32 000 troops to some 20 000 by April
2000.
t hess confercnce at LiN Headquart€rs on 27 Oct$er
1999.
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86. The main objectives of the Dayton Peace
Agreement were the establishment of peace and
ttre creation of a multi-ethnic state. Peace has
indeed been established thanks to the massive
pressnce of foreign troops. The gradual stabili-
sation of the situation in the country has made
possible a degree of rationalisation and over time
the foreign mrlitary presence, now called SFO&
has been reduced. Neverttreless, it is still essen-
tial for security in the country.
87. The relative stability is also a consequence
ofthe fact that most ethnic groups are now living
in their own areas. This is contrary to the inten-
tion underlying the Dayton Agreement. There are
still over a million refugees or displaced persons,
in Bomia and elsewhere, who have not yst re-
turned to their homes. Intenrational organisations
continue to claim that their rsh,un is an ongoing
process. But where do things stand in this con-
nection? Recently, the symbolic retum of the first
Muslim to Srebrenica was celebrated by an offi-
cial ceremony attended by Western diplomats
and local Serb politicians. However, immediately
after the official handover of the keys to his
house, the reluctant star of this festive occasion,
Mr Aaz Begrc, said he did not intend to live in
Srebrenicae.
88. The international community's efforts to
bolster the credibility of the multi<thnic state are
as yet by no means exhausted. Fear and hatred
are still present. Time, education and the devel-
opment of new attitudes of mind mean that new
values and different circumstances will one day
prevail. Malong an ideal a point of principle
serves to ensure that although it has not yet come
to pass, it will one day. It has now started hap-
pening in the Lebanon and possibly in Israel,
therefore why not in the Balkans as well?
89. Not snough progress is being made on the
issue of missing persons. There are still mass
graves which have not been opened and cleared.
Hundreds of bodies which have been exhumed
have been stored in morgues (under very unsatis-
factary conditions), which may later lead to com-
plicate identification. There is both a lack of will
and of resouces to reach a quick solution to this
problem, although this is a vital condition for any
future reconciliation between the three ethnic
groups in the country.
90. In order to become a viable state, Bosnia
and Herzegovina must establish sustainable pol-
itical and economic sfuctures. Successive elec-
tions have started to break the monopoly hol(
along the various ethnic divides, of the nationalist
parties, still prominent in which are those politi-
cians who led the warring factions. There has
been progress towards some kind of political
pluralism. However, there is still some way to
go. The victors of the last elections still see the
electoral process as a means of legitimation of
unfettered power.
9l. Evsn more worrying is the limited progrcss
towards new economic structures and a viable
market economy. Comrption is still rampant and
a recent rqlort has rwealed that at least US$ 200
million of the US$ 5 billion reconstruction aid
has vanished into thin air. However, financial
conftol by international aid organisations is also
inefficient. Economic insecurity is stil a serious
threat to stability. Under such circumstances,
fundamental economic reforms are difficult to
implement and with the five-year reconstnrction
aid programme drawing to a close, the country is
still overwhelmingly donordependent. Neverthe-
less, the Bosnian leadership is still seeking to
consolidate its control over ttre economy, a
soruce to it of funds and patronage. This keeps
alive a clientelist system.
92. It has been pointed out that urgent and
radical reform is needed on a number of issues.
Many regulations which hamper economic devel-
opmsnt should be abolished or changed, such as
barriers to tade between the two entities. The
system requiring virtually all economic transac-
tions to be channelled through party-controlled
"payments bureaux" must be dismantled. This
syste,m, which provides the leading nationalist
parties with an important soruce of income, was
roundly de,nounced at the Madrid Conference of
the Peace Implementation Council in Decenrber
1998 but to no avail. Comrption must be brought
under conaol. The present complicated tax tegis-
lation requires urgent reform. Privatisation laws
have been adopted and are now in place but they
should be implemented without bureaucratic or
political ob stnrctiont o.
'0 Robert Barry in the Financial Times, 22 October
1999.
l8
e Le Monde,27 S€pterriber 1999.
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93. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the existence of Republika Srpska within
that state, both outcomes of the Dayton Peace
Agreemeirt now face the test of time and human
resolve. It must be acknowledged that for the
time being at least, the situation cannot be altered
because there is no remedy to the ethnic cleans-
ing that took place in that part of Bomia and no
precedsnt that can be invoked for the surrounding
areas. It is nevertheless too soon to pass a final
judgment on those outcomes. Those at whose
door the uagedy in Bosnia can be laid, in some
cases war crimfunls, are still there and occupying
positions of responsibility. Although this artifi-
cial situation is a particularly delicate one, might
it nevertheless give rise to a consciously ac-
cepte4 voluntary and lasting process? Yet such
is indeed the aim. Europe, rent by history has
nevertheless been able on occasion to come up
with solutions.
(c) The Federal Reptublic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
(i) Serbia
The po li ti c al s i tuati on
94. According to prevailing opinion in the
West Mr Milosevic's autocratic regime has been
a negative and destabilising factor in the series of
conflicts accompanying the dissolution of former
Yugoslavia. Most, if not all, westem govern-
metrts are therefore agrleed tlut replacement of
Mr Milosevic and his regime by more democratic
forces, preferably through free and fair elections,
is one esssntial condition for the establishment of
peace and stabilrty in souttrrastem Europe.
95. Western governments and the European
Union as a whole have therefore decided to sup-
port the parties opposlng Mr Milosevic's rule.
However, this is no easy matter. The effective-
ness of sanctions as a means of forcing out the
present regime should not be overestimated and
the EU is therefore seeking to adjust its policy in
that respect, as discussed below. The opposition
in Serbia is at presant in a very uncomfortable
position given that although it carurot be said
that the general public has again swung behind
Milosevic, feelings about NATO action are still
ridmg high and fall somewhere between ttre ultra-
nationalist line that has prevailed for the last ten
years or so and expectations for the future. Pub-
lic opinion is in a higtly confused and volatile
state. Those who do not toe the line are suspected
of selling out on the country's legitimate inter-
ests. Whenever external intervention becomes too
harsh or threatening, grying priority for example
to the workings of the International Criminal
Tdbunal on the Former Yugoslavia over meas-
ures to improve the lot of Serbs, it upsets ttrem
greatly. The opposition parties have to work on
the outlook of a people bombarded with ultra-
nationalist propaganda for years, which carmot
be turned round from one day to the next. For the
time being, they are loohng to the West to make
tle case that it did not go to war against the Serb
people and that the Serbs have a place in tomor-
row's Ewopell.
96. When the EU Foreign Ministers invited 32
representatives of the Serbian opposition move-
ment to a meeting in Luxembourg on l1 October
1999, the leaders of the Alliance for Change and
ofthe Serbian Renewal Movement Zorat Djind-
jic and Vuk Draskovic, and nine others, did not
attsnd because they did not agree with a draft
declaration calhng on them to hand over indicted
war criminals to the Intemational Criminal Tri-
bunal in The Hague as a condition of receiving
aid if and when Mr Milosevic's coalition was
overthrown. The meeting was conve,lred to ce-
ment good relations between the European Union
and the people of the FRY. The EU declaration
which was issued after the meeting enumerated a
number of activities which the Union is to under-
take to help the FRY enhance stability and
growth in south-eastem Europe once the gov-
enrmsnts of Serbia and the FRY are under the
political control of democratic forces and the
FRY fully cooperates withtlre ICTY.
97. Daily public rallies which have now been
taking place for several weeks at the initiative of
the Alliance for Change, have failed to attract
enough support to force Mr Milosevic to resign.
Elections may ttrerefore be the only way to se-
cure political change in Belgrade, but at the same
time there is no guarantee that Mr Milosevic's
coalition will not ultimately carry the day. Those
elections would still leave Mr Milosevic in place,
as he was elected by the Federal Parliament for a
four-yearterm lasting until Juty 2001.
98. On 14 October 1999, the Alliance for
Change, under Democratic Party leader Zoran
" Statementbythe FrenchForeign Minister, Mr Hrbert
Vedrine, Luxenrbourg ll ft&er 1999.
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Djindjic, and the Serbian Rsnewal Movement
under Vuk Draskovic, concluded an agreement
on a joint set of technical conditions for elections
which they feel should be held as soon as pos-
sible. The agree,ment includes inter alia condi-
tions on a proportional representation systerrL
withdrawal of the October 1998 law on the me-
di4 balanced access to state television and the
presence of foreign observers at elections. The
agreement did not mention the possibility of a
coalition or shared slate.
gg. The Serbian Renewal Movement has now
demanded elections at local, provincial and fed-
eral level before the end of 1999. The mandate of
the pre'sent Serbian Parliament nrns until 2001
and those ofthe local and federal elected bodies
until 2000. Mr Milosevic's regime, however, is
likely to agree to go to the polls early only in
local elections, in tlre hope that this will further
split the opposition. Mr Qindjic's pressure to
prqpare a single list of candidates for all the par-
ties belonging to the Alliance for Democracy has
led to some parties leaving tlre Alliance.
100. The European Union will not find it easy
to strike the right balance between supporting
Serbian opposition leaders in their efforts to win
elections against Mr Milosevic's coalition and
wounding the Serbian people's national pride in
the wake of the NATO air strikes which Serbs
perceived as humiliating and wholly unjustified.
It should not be forgotten that 
- 
righAy or wrong-
ly 
- 
the majority of Serbs have a different per-
ception to the West of what happened in Kosovo.
l0l. Serbs had a collective responsibility for
tlre conflict in Kosovo, which they find difficult
to a&nit. Nationalism is an important rallying
cry in their endeavours to affirm their identity.
Kosovo is still universally regarded as the cradle
of the Serbian nation and even more moderate
Serbs find forergn intervention in the province
and its pressnt conseque,nces very difficult to
stomach.
Economic sanctions against the FRY
102. Recently, the political opposition in Serbia
urged the United States to rsmove sanctions
against the FRY, waming that such punitive
measures would only harm ordinary citizens and
help entrench President Milosevic in powey'2. It
was argued that continuing sanctions allow Mr
Milosevic to lay the blame for the hardships
which the Serbs are facrng on ttre outside world
and make it easier for him to remain in govem-
ment. The US Administration believes ttrat mas-
sive popular revolt over sanctions leading to sev-
ere hardship in ttre coming winter may lead to his
being ousted. It is also concerned that any re-
vision of the present sanctions regime would
offer Mr Milosevic an opportunity to use divi-
sions in the Euro-Atlantic Alliance to his own
advantage.
103. The opposition asked for an irnnediate
resumption of commercial air travel connections
to Belgrade and basic humanitarian aid, includ-
ing fuel. A majority of European Union countries
including France and Germany support this re-
quest, provided that sanctions targeted specifi-
cally against Mr Milosevic and his cronies are
maintained.
104. Following a decision of ll October 1999
lifting the air ernbargo agains Montenegro and
Kosovo, the European Union plans to deliver
heating fuel to the Serbian cities of Nis and Pirot
which are in the hands of the political opposition.
Russia has already started deliveries of natural
gas and oil to Serbia.
105. France and Germany are also backing an
EU plan to clear the rubble of the three bridges
over tJre Danube which were destroyed at Novi
Sad and to build a temporary bridge. These and
other destoyed bridges elsewhere along the river
are blocking trade and shipprng and may cause
severe floodrng by obstucting the passage of ice
on the river.
106. Yielding to pressure from a delegation of
high-ranking Serbian opposition leaders under
former Central Bank Govemor, Dragoslav Awa-
movic, the United States finally decided to sup-
port the EU programme to supply Nis and Pirot
with heating oil for the.coming winter. If this
programme is successfril, the United States will
consider supporting its extension to other cities.
However, it continues to oppose other European
proposals to ease the sanctions regime.
107. The US Govemment at the same time
proposed lifting sanctions on oil deliveries and
flights to Belgrade in retum for early free and
fair elections in Serbia, with Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright insisting that Mr Milosevic's1 z I n t ern ati ona I Heral d Tr ib une, 26 October I 999.
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coalition could not possibly win a fair election.
The offer was immediately dismissed bythe Yug-
oslav Government.
(ii) Montenegro
108. After the conflict in Kosovo, Montenegro
found itself in a difficult position. During the
conflict, the President of Montenegro, Milo Dju-
kanovic, dsnounced Belgrade's policy in Kosovo.
However, while criticising Mr Milosevic's poli-
cies, he had also criticised those of NATO, which
had bombed targets on Montenegrin territory.
109. The conflict in Kosovo and the sanctions
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have
had a very damaging impact on Montenegro's ec-
onomy. Nearly 80% of the worldorce is unem-
ployed, there is widespread comrption, sanctions
busting and smuggling, and because of the
intemational sanctions, Montenegto is still denied
access to World Bank and IMF resources. Aware
of the precarity of the situation" the EU has al-
ready lifted its ban on air travel and fuel supplies
to the country.
110. Since June 1999, President Djukanovic
has besn tryrng to reach an agreemsnt of prin-
ciple with Serbia, the other republic of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, on democratic rela-
tions between the two republics. ln August Mon-
tsnegro proposed negotiations on a more equal
relationship within the FRY, with each of the
republics maintarning its own army and having
its own crurency. In those proposals not a word
was said about independence or secession but
back in June, the President had announced that
the Governmsnt would hold a referendum to de-
cide Montenegro's future.
I I l. On 13 October 1999, kesideff Djukanovic's
party, the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists
of Montenegro, accepted an offer from Mr Milo-
sevic's Socialist Parry of Serbia to start negot-
iations on ttre future status of the Federation.
II2. Negotiations over the restructuring of the
Federation started on 25 October, but as yet no
progress has been made. However, both sides
have played down the possibility that a secession
could lead to another violent conflict.
113. It seems that President Djukanovic is try-
ing to orchestrate what one commentator has
described as "salami secession"l3 proceeding by
several stages 
- 
an inde,pendent foreign policy,
separate crurency, rela:<ation ofborder controls 
-
towards an ever more specific Montenegrin iden-
tity. The Government of Montenegro, encouraged
by the United States, has decided to accept the
German mark as legal tender alongside the dinar
(from I November 1999) to protect itself against
steep inflation in the FRY, now running at the
rate of 100% per annum and against what it has
described as Federal fiscal irresponsibility. The
United States would appear to support such tac-
tics, very likely because it favours any move that
might damage Mr Milosevic's position.
114. It should, however, be noted that there is
no corsensus among the population of Montene-
gro about its futue status. Opinion polls indicate
that at least 40Yo are against breaking ties with
Serbia, while a further 40o/o are in favour of in-
dependence.
I15. After publication of Presidem Djukanovic's
negotiation proposals in August slans in various
pa:ts of Mortenqgro in favour of maintaining close
linls with Serbia started to meet and discuss how
to act in the event of the Governme,nt in Pod-
gorica managrng to break up ttre FRY through
secession.
116. The Morilenegrin Foreign Minister, Branko
Perovic, has declared thatttre proposals are sub-
ject to deadlines and that negotiations with Bel-
grade and a possible referendum on independence
could not be stetched out much beyond April
2000. As is often the case, Mr Milosevic's re-
action is uncertain but he still has a few cards up
his sleeve, rarrgng from delaying tactics in the
negotiations to use of Federation armed forces to
bring Montenegro to heel. On ttre other hand, by
far the easiest thing for him to do would be to
fomsnt civil strife that may already be in the
making.
(d) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM)
117. Since the Political Committee's last re-
poftlo, no major changes have taken place in the
economy or inter-sthnic relations, the two main
issues in national politics.
I 3 Anna Hnsarska it Nansweek, 8 Nwehb€r 1999.
I a Assenibly Document 1653, Rapporteur N{rs Squarcia-
lupi.
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118. On the other hand, relations betwesn
FYROM and Greece are improving. At present,
Greece is FYROM's primary foreign investor.
However, UN-brokered negotiations bstween
FYROM and Greece on a new name for the Re-
public of Macedonia are making very slow pro-
gless.
119. As Assembly Document 1653 notes, the
joint declaration and accompanying agreements
of 22 February 1999 have laid down the basis for
good relations between FYROM and Bulgari4
with scope for furttrer developme,nt and deepen-
,ng
120. The end of the conflict in Kosovo resulted
in an almost immediate and massive retum of
some 250 000 refugees accommodated in camps,
with host families and elsewhere. At ttre begn-
ning of October 1999, the Government estimated
the total number of refugees in the country to be
some 20 000 to 25 000 persons. These figures
included those who had come to FYROM as a
result of earlier conflicts caused by the break-up
of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and a number
of new refugees, mostly Romanian, who had fled
Kosovo out of fear of punitive action on the part
of the Kosovar Albanians.
l2l. It should be said to the credit of the politi-
cal leaders and parties of FYROM that they did
not exploit the conflict in Kosovo and the major
influx of refugees inthe first half of 1999 in zuch
a way as to exacerbate existing te,lrsions between
Macedonians and the large Albanian minority.
Under such exfeme circumstances it was impor-
tant to hold the country together and clamp down
on any attempt to stir up trouble.
122. Howevel tlrc conseque,lrce has been that
little progress has been made on the really impor-
tant issues referred to above and the Goverrment
has not delivered on its arnbitious progfttrnme.
Among other ttrings, it has been extremely reluc-
tant to rationalise and privatise large and ineffi-
cient state companies, knowing that this would
lead to massive redundancies and social unrest.
123. The FYROM Government is dissatisfied
with the financial assistance it has received for
dealing with the consequences of the refugee
crisis. Early in October 1999 it pointed out that
only US$ 60 million of the US$ 252 million
pledged at the May 1999 donors' conference in
Paris had bee,n delivered to Skopje. FYROM is
still the main charmel for humanitarian aid and
troops bound for Kosovo and the resulting size-
able foreign presence is becoming unpopular in
the country. Military and humanitarian aid con-
voys are causing havoc onthe roads and borders
of FYROM and the Governme,nt is complaining
about the inte,nse wear and tear the roads are
being subjected to, for which it wants compensa-
tion. There are also rumerous complaints about
the behaviour of KFOR personnel which is gv-
ing rise to nuisance and incidents. These include
the death of a government minister in a head-on
collision with a NATO vehicle.
124. Both the lack of financial assistance and
the miisive and problematic foreign presence are
easily exploited by politicians vvi5hing to stir up
dissatisfaction :rmong the population and possi-
bly destabilise an equilibrium that is still fragile.
It is therefore of the utnost importance for west-
ern Europe to continue to ke€p a close eye on
FYROM, the only multi-ethnic state on the terri-
tory of former Yugoslavia which has suniived
without violent confl ict.
125. The main preoccupation in national poli-
tics at ttre moment are the preparations for the
presidential elections, to be held on 3l October
and 14 November 1999. The outgoing President
Kiro Gligorov, who has completed two terms in
office, is notto stand again.
126. Although the three parties in the ruling
coalition initially decided to put forward a 5ingls
candidate, personal and political differences have
led to the break-up of this agreement. [n particu-
lar, the International Macedonia Revolutionary
Organisation/Dsmocratic Party for Macedonian
National unity 0/MRo-DPMNE) - the largest
party in the country 
- 
felt it had to put forward
its own candidate. The outcome of the presiden-
tial elections may therefore result in fragmenta-
tion of the coalition but not necessarily early
parliamentary elections.
127. The three ruling coalition parties and the
three opposition parties each fielded their own
candidate. The ruling coalition candidates are:
Boris Trajkovski (VMRO-DPMNE), currently
Deputy Foreign Minister, Vasil Tupurkovski of
the Democratic Alternative, parly leader and Dir-
ector of the Agency for Reconsfructiorq and
Muharem Nexhipi of the Democratic Party of
Albanians, currently Deputy Minister for Health.
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128. Opposition party nominees were as fol-
lows: Stojan Andov of the Liberal Democratic
Party, a fonner Speaker of ttre Parliamsnt, Mu-
hamed Halili of the etlmic Albanian Party for
Dflnocratic Prosperity, currenfly FYROM's Am-
bassador to Denmarl and Tito Petkovski of the
Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, also a
former Speaker ofthe Parliament.
129. tn the first round of the elections, Tito
Pe&ovski took the lead and faces Boris Traj-
kovski in the run-offvote on 14 November 1999.
The results of the first round are a clear indi-
cation of the widespread public discontent with
the Government' s perfonnance.
III. The Stability Paa
(a) Origins: the Cologne Summit
130. The first political response by the Euro-
pean Union to the Kosovo crisis and the political
and economic problems in the Balkans was the
dnftng of a "Stability Pact", adopted on 10 June
1999 atthe Cologne Summit by the foreign min-
isters of some 30 or so countries, meeting under
the chairrnanship of Mr Joschka Fischer. The
European Union and G8 countries (including
Russi4 the United States, Canada and Japan) the
countries of former Yugoslavia, apart from the
Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, the ottrer Balkan
counties and their neighbours, including Turkey,
and many international organisations including
the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the
IMF andthe World Bank were all represented.
I31. This working "instrument" lays down a
framework within which numerous countries,
regional and international organisations and in-
ternational fina:rcial institutions collaborate to
make a contibution to peace, stability and eco-
nomic development in the regron. The Pact un-
derscores the key role of the European Union in
developing programmes for strengthening demo-
cracy, revitalising the economy and developing
the contractual ties betwesn ttre countries within
ttre region.
132. The machinery of the Stabilrty Pact re-
volves around a Special Coordinator, Bodo Hom-
bactr, appointed by the European Union after
consultation with the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
and other participants, with the endorsement of
the Chairman-in-Office ofthe Council of Europe.
The Coordinator makes periodic progress reports
to the OSCE and also chairs the South-Eastern
Europe Regional Table, the forum whose task it
will be to advance the aims of the Pact and co-
ordinate the three Working Tables on democrat-
isation and human rights, economic reconstruc-
tion, development and cooperation and security
issues. The Working Tables will prepare specific
me:rures towards the implementation of the Pact
and may set up sub-tables.
133. Those who will take part in the Tables
include the msmbers of the Stability Pact, namely
the European Union me,rrrber states, the European
Commission, Albania, Bomia and Herzegovinq
Bulgari4 Croatia, FYROM, Hungary, Romani4
Russi4 Sloveni4 Turkey, the United States, the
OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Council of
Europe Representative, the "facilitator" states
and organisations: Canada and Japan, the UN,
I.JNHC& NATO, OECD, WEU, IMF, EIB, EBRD
andtheWorld Bank.
134. The European Union has been given two
specific tasks: re-establishment and development
of contractual relations between the countries of
the regions and implementation of reconstuction
proglarnmes.
(b) The Sarajevo Summit:
the Stability Pad gets under way
135. It was at the summit meeting in Sarajevo
ttrat the Stability Pact got offthe ground. On 30
July 1999, forty or so heads of state and govern-
ment whose number included Mr Clintoq Mr
Chirac, Mr Blair and Mr Schroder, and represen-
tatives of the United Nations, NATO and the
other major international organisations met in
Sarajevo, where they reaffirmed their commit-
ment to set the Pact 
- 
an initiative on the part of
Germany which the European Union had ap-
proved in Cologne in early June 
- 
in motion. The
Summit took on a highly symbolic charge, as all
the participants, particularly Bernard Kouchner,
the Kosovo civilian administrator aclnowledged.
Arrivrng direct from Pristina, he welcomed this
form of intervention (the Pact) as a way of main-
taining south-eastern Europe as the focus of at-
tention "because stability camot reign in the re-
gion while ttrere is no stability in each of its com-
ponent parts".
136. The heads of state and government reaf-
firmed ttreir daermination collectively and indi-
vidually to give concrste meaning to the Pact by
bri"gr"g about economic and political reforms
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and development and greater security to the re-
gion. The summit participants stressed that assis-
talce from other countries was conditional on
implementation of the objectives of the Pact and
cooperation betwesn the Balkan countries them-
selves, emphasising the ability to cooperate and
establish good neighbourly agreements and re-
conciliation as important criteria in evaluating
their prospects for full integration into the Euro-
pean Union. In this spiriq the Pact would seek to
promote, and hence provide financial help for,
transnational projects such as ffiastructure, bor-
der controls and the fight against drugs and or-
ganised crime. At a press conference, the Special
Coordinator, Bodo Hombach, made clear that the
Pact should not be regarded as a means of
slowing down EU accession but rather as a fast
track leading to it.
137. Another major question discussed at the
Sarajevo Summit was ttre situation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The message of
ttre leadership of the Pact to the absent Serbs
was, bluntly, that they should be seeking to effect
a transition to democracy and consequenfly to
overtum Slobodan Milosevic's regime.
138. However the Summit did not look beyond
the stated intentions as to how the Pact should
operate, the resources available or specific plans
as to its implementatiorq thus justifring ttrose
who (like the French) with hindsight who took
the view *rat an ill-prepared meeting of that na-
ture had been premature. In an attempt to counter
the overt scepticism of the FYROM President in
particular as to the practical impact of the Pact
and ttre Summit, the Finnish Presidency of the
European Union announced ttrat the first Re-
gonal Table meeting would take place i, Sep-
tember 1999.
(c) Thefvst Regional Tqblc h Brussek:
practical action
139. The first meeting of the South-Eastern
Europe Regronal Table under the Stability Pact 
-
covering the Westem Balkans 
- 
gave rise essen-
tially to administative decisions. As rhe steering
body, the Regronal Table coordinates and steers
the work of the three working groups. The par-
ticipants agreed on who would be appointed to
chair ttrese Working Tables. The Working Table
on democratisation and human rights would be
chaired by Max van der Stoel (Netherlands) of
the OSCE, the Working Table on economic re-
constructiorq development and cooperation would
be headed by Fabrizio Saccomani of the Cenaal
Bank of Italy and last but not least the Working
Table on security issues would be chaired by the
Swedish Foreign Minister, Jan Eliasson.
140. It was envisaged that ttre working groups
meet regularly, at least once every six months,
normally in the country that holds the vice-chair-
manship. However the inaugural meeting of the
Group responsible for human rights would be
held in Switzerland, ttrat of the group on recon-
struction in Italy and ttrat of the group on secu-
rity i" Norway. Exceptionally, the groups would
be co-chaired bythe host courtry.
I41. Each group is tlen to agree on a timetable
of work and decide whether the formation of sub-
groups is appropriate. The human rights group is
to be reqponsible for the cultural di-
mension of the stabilisation process.
142. The Regional Table for the Pact has also
adopted its own plan of work which will cover
both its own future activities and, in broad out-
line, those of ttre ttree working groups set up un-
der the Pact. Each of these will then sst up more
dstailed schedules for implementing specific prio-
rity initiatives in the areas they are concerned
with. In principle, the plan of work adopted will
hold good until the end of the year 2000 but can
nevertheless be reviewed and updated in the in-
tervening period if necessary.
(i) Working Table on Democratisation and
Human Ngh*
143. The main aim of the goup is to contriburc
to the democratic development of the countries of
the region by sefdng up transparent and effective
institutions, the development of a democratic and
effective electoral system and the reform of the
judicial system. The Group must also monitor
compliance with human and minority rights. Ac-
cording to the pla::, the Table will:
consider, as a matter of priority, estab-
lishing regional cooperation machinery
and sfruchrres between the countries of
the regon;
encourage cooperation between coun-
tries with a view to preserving ethnic
diversity and protecting minorities (for
example by agreeing special treaties in
ttrat cormection);
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- 
train civil servants of the countries con-
cerned in their role in a democratic soc-
i"ty;
foster cooperation bstween local and
regional authorities and governments;
oiplore the possibilities of helping the
forces of democracy in the FRY and
Serbia, so as to en$ue that the FRY
can play its part in implementing the
Paci at the earliest opporfunity;
- 
help NGOs define their role in civilian
socisfy;
establish a legislative .framework to
guraffee press and media freedom and
promote inter-regional cooperation bet-
weenthe media;
stengthen women's role in society and
the cultural dimension in the process of
stabilising the region;
deepen cooperation over refugee issues.
(ii) Working Table on Economic Recorutruc-
tion, Development and Cooperation
144. Its main task is to contribute to stabilising
the economies of the countries of the regtoq
particularly by strengthening free market prin-
ciples and thus increasing private investors' con-
fidence in those economies. Among the main
principles advocated are:
- 
the creation of a legal and fiscal frame-
work to encourage invesfrnent in the
countries of the region;
setting up a sound economic and fin-
ancial systeq on the basis of recom-
mendations from international financial
institutions;
increasing compatibility between trade
and transport systerns within the region
though minimum harmonisation of
rules and standards;
setting up stnrctures for advice and
support to businesses in the regon, in-
cluding support for establishing new
businesses;
improving the nrles goveming compe-
tition and state aid and making them
more transparent;
promoting dialogue betwesn represen-
tatives of both sides of industy: em-
ployers and trades unions;
evaluating and promoting inter-regional
infrastructue projects in the fields of
tansport, energy and telecommunica-
tions.
(iii) Working Table on Security Issues
145. The main strategic objective of this goup
is to help create a climate of confidsnce and se-
curitythroughoutthe region (and also reduce and
rationalise military expenditure) through wide-
spread dsmilitarisation of Balkans society and by
introducing democratic scrutiny ofthe armed for-
ces and existing paramilitary groups. The work-
mg goup is also concerned with counties' in-
ternal security (ustice and internal atrairs). Pri-
orities inttris area include:
improving the effectiveness of legal
prosecutions services and effective im-
plementation of laws;
reforming criminal juris diction;
- 
promoting cooperation between the le-
gal authorities of the various countries
in the region to help them deal with the
various crime waves they have to con-
tend with: the fight against organised
crime, drug trafficking, illegal immi-
gration etc.;
- 
helprng the countries of the region pro-
gressively integrate into Europol stnrc-
tures and activities;
improving the administration of bor-
ders, including visa services.
146. Bodo Hombach made clear his satisfaction
with the quick and efficisnt dispatch of this first
meeting. He noted that neither the Stability Pact
itself nor coordination thereof were intended to
add to the burden of existing stuctures or do
what ottrers were already doing: rather, the Pact
was there to stimulate them to action. Thus he
attempted to grve the lie to the idea of the birttr of
a new bureaucracy. Whsn asked about tIrc cost
of reconstruction and aid to ttre Balkans area, he
shied away from putting a figure on this on the
grounds that it was not his job. Nor was he very
clear as to how long the Pact would remain in
force or the duration of his term as Coordinator,
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which would be determined by how ttre situation
in the Balkans progressed.
147. Later, before the European Parliament's
Foreign Affairs Committee, he undertook to enter
into open and constnrctive dialogue with that
body, stressing that the European Parliament
could have a fronfline role in an inter-parliamen-
tary framework covering the region and reaffirm-
ing that the European Union had a leading part to
play inthe Stability Pact.
(d) Inougural meeting of the Working Table
on Reconstruction
148. The Workfug Table on Recorstruction held
its first meeting in Bari, Italy, on 9 October 1999.
The European Commission represertrative, Fabrizio
Barbaso, tabled four working papers setting out
in dstail the aims defined the previous month.
149. The first of these related to the stabilisa-
tion and parbrership process the Commission is
offeringttre countries of ttre region. Here, stabili-
sation is viewed in the light of European Union
accession. Six main areas of action for the future
are identified:
development of existing economic and
commercial relations and of financial
and economic assistance. The Commis-
sion is to review its financial instnr-
msnts and adapt them as necessary to
the funding needs of programmes of
regional dimension;
assistance towards democratisatiorq
building a civil society and institutional
development. To this end, the Com-
mission mrght revise the Tempus pro-
gnmme to extend access to it to the
countries of the region and consider
setting up a network of organisations
for building democracy and promoting
civil society;
fostering cooperation in various fields,
mainly justice and intenral affairs;
political dialogue at regional level;
a new form of contactual relations 
-
stabilisation and partrrership agree-
ments.
150. The second working paper deals with ttre
development of free trade. While the proportion
of the region's trade with the European Union is
betwesn 60%o and 90%o (according to country)
and the European Union has established a gener-
ous regime offering regional exports virtually
duty-free access to markets, the Commission
feels that action to foster free trade could in the
future focus on:
- 
the creation ofbilateral free trade areas
and an extension of those that exist al-
ready;
- 
harmonisation of trade arrangemsnts
betwesn tlrose counties and otlrer par-
ticipants in the Pact in order to bring
them up to the level of unilateral EC
preferential arranganents ;
other Pact me,mbers ganting similar
trade preference;
support from all Pact m€rnbers who are
also members of the World Trade Or-
ganisation for a WTO waiver gratring
preferurtial arrangernents to those coun-
tries and between therL by derogation
from the principle of "most favoured
nation status",
- 
technical assistanrce from all WTO Pact
msmbers to support the customs serv-
ices ofthe countries ofthe region and
their accession to the WTO.
15l. The third paper deals wittr specialist assis-
tance for legal harmonisation. Since all countries
of the regron aspire to EU me,rrrbership in the
future, it is important that ttreir endeavours to
harmonise their legal systems take account of EU
acquis.
152. Lastly, the fourth working paper deals
with regional environmsntal projects in south-
eastern Europe.
153. As far as the financial machinery for the
Pact is concerned, European Union aid to the
regron since 1991 stands at over €16 billion. The
Commission is takrng a three-pronged approach:
Community aid will continue to be
provided to the counfies of the region
in the form oftechnical assistance, in-
vestnent aid and, as necessary, aid in
terms ofthe balance of payments;
a part of Community aid will go to-
wards firnding regional initiatives;
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ttre European Union will continue to
cooperate closely with the World Bank
to mobilise the necessary donor fund-
ing. The Commission and the World
Bank are to organise a regional donors'
conference in consultation with the
Working Table on Reconstruction.
154. Countries in south+astern Europe have
until now been slighfly disappointed by the im-
plementation of tlre Stabilrty Pact. They expected
it to provide money for an immediate reconstnrc-
tion of the reglon, as they thought had happened
in westem Europe with the Marshall Plan. Spe-
cial Coordinator Hombach has pointed out how-
ever, that the Stability Pact provides a frame-
work with requirernents and conditions for pro-
jects which should attract investors. The process
of identifying investnent targets has now begun.
The European lnvestnent Bank will convene a
special meeting on 25 Noverrber for a first re-
view of potential projects which are thought to
cost around €2 billion. The Stability Pact favours
in particular joint projects which improve the
ffiastmcture of the region.
IV Conclusions
155. In the l9th and 20th centuries, the basic
attributes of a State recognised as lawful were
sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviola-
bility of its borders. These principles remain the
universal foundation of all international demo-
cratic systems and the basis governing the role
and functions of the United Nations and the dis-
charge of its mandates.
156. However, the problem of Kosovo within
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (alongside
other problems of ilre same ilk elsewhere in the
world) has led to the emergsnce of ottrer rights
and duties and, seemingly, the advent of new in-
ternational norrns, both political and moral: hu-
man rights, humanitarian rights and duties and
the right or duty to intervene. The issue is a sens-
itive one and serves to explain differential assess-
ments of Iraq, Kosovo or ChechnyE for example.
The dominant nations of Asia and South America
are obviously opposed to such an approach.
157 . Moreover, the risk of intervention without
United Nations agreement to enforce compliance
with such rights means tlrat great care would
have to be exercised if the doctrine were in prac
tice to become an obligation. Thus, this reorder-
ing of new international norms and relations
betwesn sovereign states on the basis of human
rights is something that needs to be discussed ur-
gently. The world we live in is bi-polar no longer
and must remain essentially multipolar in nature.
Globalisation of any description under one-power
domination would generate further risks.
158. [n our present world, which has been taken
apart since 1989 and is now in the process of
beurg put together agar4 a reordering of our
basic values and the role and function of interna-
tional institutions is essential. One way of look-
ing at things is to see determinism as the inexo-
rable driving force in history while an alternative
view draws on the American historian Hunting-
ton's thesis of an inevitable clash of cultures,
which confers respectability on the idea of "eth-
nic purity" within given areas of territory accord-
ing to a demarcation based essentially on relig-
ious tradition.
159. Consequently, western democracies have a
duty to point to the force of values such as toler-
ance, secularism and accountability and to re-
mind the world that democracy is the only systern
to erect those values as its essential pillars. Edu-
cation and culture alone provide a vehicle for
passrng on to humanity at large the rights that lie
at ttre heart of respect for the individual.
160. Democracy, it should be remsmberd is
not the outcome of a spontaneous happelring but
rather of conscious and willed and often uphill
action over the long term. Europe 
- 
and the Bal-
kars especially 
- 
are riddled with every kind of
diversity. European history is steeped in drama
and bears the scars of wars and wounds every bit
as deadly as those of Kosovo but outside the
Bdkans area, Europe is now at peace and in the
process of coming together as one. It is now time
for the Balkans to throw in its lot on the side of
cooperation and negotiation. Peace and prosper-
ity would ttren emerge victorious ttrere, as else-
where, over violence and haued.
16l. It is hardly surprising their that integration
into ttre European Union is regarded as a univer-
sal panacea by politicians of the region. The
notion of European integration as the harbinger
of peace, stabilrty and prosperity comes to the
fore in every single discussion on the future of
south-eastem Europe.
27
DOCUMENT 1666
162. It is worth pointing out in this connection
ttrat the region itself must also shoulder its re-
sponsibilities for as long as it does not meet the
conditions for firll membership of the EU. Coun-
uies in the region must organise themselves
through bi-, tri- or multilateral approaches. Ex-
a:nples exist already in the form of the recent
agreem€rfs between Bulgaria and FYROM and
the substantial improveme,nt in relations between
FYROM and Greece. Albania is proposing that a
customs union be sst up between itself and Bul-
garia and FYROM.
163. Another question which the counties in
the region will need to discuss, is the kind of in-
stitutions, instruments or tools they wish to ert-
ploy in their endeavours to fomr closer ties with
one another. Do they want to begin by creat-
rng organisations like the European Coal and
Steel Community, which was a first and very im-
portant step towards the European UniorU or are
they already thinking in terms of a federation of
the various states?
164. It is also important for these countries to
decide whether they want to defend their national
or regional interests and whether they can sub-
scribe to the fact that borders mean something
different within the European Union. Finally,
they may have to give thought to the conse-
quences of EU decisions taken in Cologne in June
1999, which clearly confirm the notion that Eur-
ope must take more responsibility for its own
security and defence and draw conclusions as to
the consequences of that policy for their own
region.
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